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算法价格歧视的反垄断法规制路径
网络安全与数据治理 6期
王聚兴,李晗
(中国社会科学院大学法学院,北京100083)
摘要:面对算法价格歧视可能产生的负面效果,可以通过类型化分析的方式提出针对性的规制路径。以经营者是否滥用定价算法为标准,可以将其分为理性式算法价格歧视与垄断式算法价格歧视,其中后者产生了一定的负面效果,有必要予以规制。根据实施垄断式算法价格歧视行为的主体多寡,可以细分为单独垄断式算法价格歧视与共谋垄断式算法价格歧视。前者的规制困境主要在于经营者“市场支配地位”的认定,对此可将经营者的数据优势作为推定其具有市场支配地位的重要依据;后者的规制困境主要在于竞争者“合意”的认定,对此可通过“本身违法原则”或“合理推定原则”予以解决。此外,自主类算法不存在竞争者之间的合意,只能通过“滥用市场支配地位”的规制路径予以规制。
中图分类号:DF4
文献标识码:A
DOI:10.19358/j.issn.2097-1788.2023.06.001
引用格式:王聚兴,李晗.算法价格歧视的反垄断法规制路径[J].网络安全与数据治理,2023,42(6):1-8,29.
Anti-monopoly law regulation path of algorithmic price discrimination
Wang Juxing, Li Han
(School of Law, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100083, China)
Abstract:In the face of the possible negative effects of algorithmic price discrimination, we can put forward targeted regulatory paths through typological analysis. According to whether the operator abuses the pricing algorithm, it can be divided into rational algorithm price discrimination and monopolistic algorithm price discrimination, of which the latter has a certain negative effect and it is necessary to regulate it. According to the number of subjects who implement monopolistic algorithm price discrimination, it can be subdivided into single monopolistic algorithm price discrimination and collusion monopolistic algorithm price discrimination. The former′s regulatory dilemma mainly lies in the determination of the operator′s "market dominance", for which the operator′s data advantage can be taken as an important basis for inferring its market dominance; The regulatory dilemma of the latter mainly lies in the identification of competitors′ "agreement", which can be solved by "se rule" or "reasonable presumption principle". In addition, there is no agreement between competitors in autonomous algorithms, and they can only be regulated through the regulation path of "abusing market dominance".
Key words :digital economy; pricing algorithm; price discrimination; market dominance; algorithm collusion

0 引言

个性化定价是经营者基于差别定价理论而实施的一种价格策略,与统一价格相比,其可能增加、减少社会整体福利,或使社会整体福利保持不变。唯一确定的结论是:个性化定价增加了经营者剩余(否则经营者无需实施个性化定价行为)。在传统经济时代,由于信息不对称等原因,经营者实施的个性化定价行为表现为身份折扣、批量折扣、老用户折扣、新用户优惠、高峰定价、时间折扣等,经济学家将这些行为称为“三级价格歧视”或“二级价格歧视”,由于这种规则是公开、透明的,尚且能够被消费者感知并接受;此外,这种个性化定价行为往往为消费者带来了一定福利,实现了经营者与消费者的双赢。但如果具有市场支配地位的经营者对其他经营者实施个性化定价,很可能会产生限制市场竞争的效果,经营者极易被认定为滥用市场支配性地位而受到《反垄断法》规制。故而,在传统经济时代,《反垄断法》规制的个性化定价行为主要是“经营者与经营者”之间的行为。




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作者信息:

王聚兴,李晗

(中国社会科学院大学法学院,北京100083)


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